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COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: REMEDIES OF THE
PRIVATE CONTRACTOR AGAINST A WISCONSIN
MUNICIPALITY WHERE THE CONTRACT IS ULTRA
VIRES OR DEFECTIVE
While the doctrine is well established in municipal law that
municipal contracts possess the same essential elements and are ex-
ecuted, enforced, rescinded, and reformed under the same general
doctrines as those governing contracts between private individuals,'
some aspects of municipal contracts receive different treatment be-
cause of the public interest involved. It is the purpose of this
article to explain the remedies of the private contractor where the
contract is allegedly unenforceable. The Wisconsin holdings and
statutes will be examined in the light of generally recognized prin-
ciples applied by other courts. It will become apparent that remedies
which have often been assumed to be universal rules of contract
and restitution law will vary in their application when the con-
tract of a municipality becomes the subject of litigation.
RECOVERY ON THE EXPRESS CONTRACT 2
It is uniformly conceded that if an enforceable contract has been
breached by the municipal corporation, the other party thereto may
at once sue to recover damages for its breach or to recover the
amount due thereon, just as though the contract had been made
with an individual, firm, or private corporation. 3 However, recov-
ery on the express contract has been denied against the municipal
corporation where the contract is ultra vires ;4 that is, one not with-
in the power of the municipality to make. The reason for the con-
tract being ultra vires may be that the legislature or the home rule
charter does not grant the power to contract as to the particular
1 10 McQuILULN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §29.05, at 179 (3d ed. 1950).
2 This is intended to include, in addition to express contracts, implied contracts
or implied in fact contracts, but not an implied in law or quasi-contract.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §5, comment a (1932), states that "contracts are
often spoken of as express or implied. The distinction involves, however, no
difference in legal effect, but lies merely in the mode of manifesting assent."
3 10 MCQULLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.124, at 496.
4 That is, a contract totally outside the scope of the corporate powers of the
municipal body. "The objection to the contract is not merely that the cor-
poration ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it. The con-
tract cannot be ratified by either party, because it could not have been au-
thorized by either. No performance on either side can give the unlawful con-
tract any validity, or be the foundation of any right of action upon it. ...
In a less strict sense, municipal contracts entered into in a manner and form
not prescribed by statute or charter are spoken of as ultra vires. Ultra vires
and illegality are not synonymous. A given contract may have both defects,
or one without the other, or neither." Donovan v. City of Kansas City, 352
Mo. 430, 175 S.W. 2d 874, 879 (1943), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 707 (1944).
subject matter. Courts generally say that the municipality has only
those powers which result (a) from inherent power of a munici-
pality to perform indispensible acts, (b) from express words in a
statute or charter, or (c) from what is implied as incident to the
powers expressly conferred on the municipality by a statute or the
charter. 5
The municipality may also lack the power because the con-
stitution prohibits it from doing certain things. For example, the
Wisconsin case of City of Kiel z Frank Shoe 1M1fg- Co.6 involved
an arrangement whereby the city agreed that the plant of a manu-
facturing company, if moved to the city, should be rent and tax
free for a period of five years, and that the city would convey cer-
tain real estate to the manufacturer free and clear of incumbrances,
in addition to the $12,000 that the city had promised to pay the
company for relocating. Even though the proper procedural for-
malities were present, the court declared that "the arrangement
attempted to be made on behalf of the plaintiff with the company
was beyond the power of the city, and for that reason illegal and
void, therefore not in any sense a contract. ' 7
The sense in which the court used the terms "beyond the power"
and "illegal and void" is unclear. The fact is that the contract was
ultra vires, not merely because of a lack of the grant of the par-
ticular power, but because of a constitutional prohibition s Hence,
it becomes apparent that a person contracting with a municipality
does so at his peril and must determine in advance whether or not
the corporation has the power to enter into the particular contract
in question.
Another elementary consideration in this regard is the fact that
in reviewing contracts of public corporations, the courts apply the
ultra vires rule with a greater degree of strictness to the municipal
contract than to that of the private corporation, since the rights
of the citizens of the municipality are involved.9 Inherent also in
the exercise of municipal power with respect to contracts is the
limitation of reasonableness, 0 frequently justified on the theory
that it cannot be assumed that the legislature would authorize any
unreasonable powers.
Denial of contract recovery in the above circumstances where
there has been no grant of power or the attempted contract is ex-
pressly prohibited by constitution, statute, or charter is almost with-
5 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.05, at 177.
6 240 Wis. 594, 4 N.W. 2d 117 (1942).
7Id. at 597, 4 N.W. 2d at 118.8
"The rule of taxation shall be uniform .. " Wis. CoNST. art VIII, §1.
9 RHYNE, MuNIciPAL LAW §10-3, at 257 (1957).
10 AxTiEAU, MuNIcIPAL CoRPoRaxoN LAW §5.11, at 244 (1958).
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out exception. However, it must be clearly distinguished from sit-
uations where the subject matter of the contract is fully within the
scope of the power of the municipality to make, but there has been
a failure to comply with some compulsory procedure in the forma-
tion of the contract. Typical among the latter are statutory enact-
ments requiring, among other things, that the proper municipal
official countersign each contract when the necessary funds have
been appropriated, n or that certain contracts be let only to the
"lowest responsible bidder,"' 2 or that contracts not be let unless
authorized by a majority of the city council,"3 or unless ayes and
noes have been called and recorded in voting on the approval of
any contract. 4
The purpose of these acts is to protect public funds from ex-
travagance, favoritism, and corruption; and failure to comply with
their letter will render the attempted contract void and unenforce-
able as a contract, although, as we shall see later, there may be the
possibility of recovery apart from the contract. In regard to the bidding
requirement, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated:
Whenever a city charter requires public work to be let to
the lowest bidder, it has been uniformly held that failure
to call for bids in the prescribed way ... is fatal to the pro-
ceeding. . . . The law requiring contracts to be let to the
lowest bidder is based upon public economy, and originated,
perhaps in the distrust of public officers whose duty it is to
make contracts. It is of great importance to taxpayers, and
ought not to be frittered away by exceptions .... The Legis-
lature having seen fit to hedge about municipal action by
restrictions so obviously of value to the body politic, it is not
for the courts to alter or vary them. Courts have no power to
throw the law into a melting pot, and recast it at pleasure.
They must enforce plain provisions and restrain palpable
evasions. The object of the law being to prevent favoritism,
corruption, extravagance, and improvidence in municipal
action, any arbitrary decision on their part outside of the
" Wis. STAT. §62.09(10) (1961): "Comptroller . . . (f) He shall countersign
all contracts with the city if the necessary funds have been provided to pay
the liability that may be incurred thereunder, and no contract shall be valid
until so countersigned."
12 WIS. STAT. §62.15(1) (1961) : "Contracts; how let. All public construction, the
estimated cost of which shall exceed $1,000 shall be let by contract to the
lowest responsible bidder; all other public construction shall be let as the
council may direct. The council may also by a vote of three-fourths of all
the members-elect provide by ordinance that any class of public construction
or any part thereof may be done directly by the city without submitting the
same for bids."
13WIs. STAT. §62.12(6) (c) (1961): "No debt shall be contracted against the
city nor evidence thereof given unless authorized by a majority vote of all
the members of the council."
'4 Wis. STAT. §62.11(3) (d) (1961): "On the adoption of any measure . . .
appropriating or disbursing money, or creating any liability or charge against
the city or any fund thereof, the vote shall be by ayes and noes."
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prescribed limits will be closely scrutinized and promptly
restrained.1 5
Similarly, in Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson,6 where no funds
were provided by the city council for the purposes of a contract
with an architectural firm, the contract was held void, the court
saying:
[Section] 62.09(10)(f) . . . provides that the city comp-
troller shall countersign 'all contracts with the city if the
necessary funds have been provided to pay the liability that
may be incurred thereunder, and no contract shall be valid
until so countersigned.' . . . Obviously, the objective of such
statute is to protect the taxpayers of a municipality so that
no debt will be incurred by a contract before the funds neces-
sary to discharge such liability have been provided. It stands
in the same category as does a statutory requirement that
certain municipal contracts must be let to the lowest bidder,
in that the common council has no power to waive compli-
ance with the same either at the time of the inception of a
contract or at the time of a subsequent attempt to ratify the
same.'
7
To this writer's knowledge, there is no Wisconsin authority and
only slight authority elsewhere for the position that if the statutory
provision is such a relatively unimportant safeguard that it can
be construed as being merely "directory," such a requirement that
a formal order be entered in the minutes instead of a memo, there
is no objection to allowing recovery on the express contract it-
self.'
Most courts have been fairly uniform in enforcing the "lowest
responsible bidder" statutes, and a violation of them generally pre-
cludes any recovery, particularly on the express contract. But there
are interpretations that allow recovery on the contract even for
failure to comply technically with the unswerving requirements of
the "lowest bidder" statute. Practically speaking, the most common
exception seems to be the "extra work contract." Typically, the
private contractor will have been engaged by the municipality after
the advertising and bidding have been strictly complied with and
work begun pursuant to a duly executed and authorized contract.
Then some unknown condition in the area requiring extra work,
some error in the specifications, or some necessary or desirable im-
provement involving additional cost will be encountered which is
not within the scope of the contract or the original specifications.
Additional work will be undertaken to rectify the defect, along with
15 Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 328, 331, 220 N.W. 207, 208 (1928).
16 1 Wis. 2d 148, 83 N.W. 2d 700 (1956), rehearing denied, 85 N.W. 2d 663
(1957).17Id. at 157, 83 N.W. 2d at 705.i8 COOLEY, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §73, at 238 (1913).
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and in addition to the contracted-for work. Should recovery then
be allowed at the contract rate for the "extra work," even though
it was performed without submitting bids?. A qualified "yes" must
be given, since the varying circumstances in each of the cases pre-
clude a uniform answer. For example, the Indiana court allowed
recovery on the contract for extra work done pursuant to changes
made by an unauthorized city engineer with the knowledge of the
city council when hidden sewer pipes were encountered by the
contractor. 19 Another court held that recovery will be allowed only
where the work was done with the advance permission of the proper
authorized officials.20 Still others have allowed payment for extra
work done not only at the behest of the municipality's authorized
officials, but pursuant to a provision in the contract specifically au-
thorizing payment for extra work.2 1 Akin to these latter holdings,
but somewhat modified, is the Wisconsin rule stated by our court
in a typical "extra work" fact situation:
However, the past decisions of this court make it clear that
changes made after the letting of a public contract, which
alter the manner of construction, but do not substantially
change the character of the building or unreasonably increase
its cost, and are made pursuant to a prozision in the con-
tract permitting such changes, legally may be made without
pursuing the statutory steps required to be taken before the
letting of the original contract. 2 (Emphasis added.)
In addition to the case law, contracts with municipal corpora-
tions in Wisconsin may include a provision for increasing the quan-
tity of construction required in the original contract by an amount
not to exceed fifteen per cent of the original contract price.23
Another area that has traditionally skirted the narrow confines
of procedural municipal law has been the so-called "emergency."
Despite a statute or charter requiring that the municipal contracts
be let under competitive bidding, in case of an emergency where
it is essential to tile health, safety, or welfare of the people that
19 "So, in the case at bar, the plans and specifications were defective; conditions
developed that were not known at the time the plans and specifications were
adopted and could not have been ascertained at the time with any reasonable
degree of diligence. To hold that under such circumstances the municipality,
or the agents placed in charge of the construction, were without power to
correct the mistake would be the height of folly. If then, the power to make
necessary changes does exist, and the power is exercised at added cost and
expense to the contractor, it would be unjust to deny him compensation
therefor." Michigan City v. Witter, 218 Ind. 562, 34 N.E. 2d 132, 135 (1941).
20 East Peoria v. Colianni & Dire Co., 334 Ill. App 108, 78 N.E. 2d 806 (1948).
21RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 9, §10-14, at 269.22Thomsen-Abbott Constr. Co. v. City of Wausau, 9 Wis. 2d 225, 232, 100
N.W. 2d 921, 924 (1958), citing Pung v. Derse, 165 Wis. 342, 162 N.W. 177
(1917); First Say. & Trust Co. v. Milwaukee County, 158 Wis. 207, 148 N.W.
22, 148 N.W. 1093 (1914); and Mueller v. Eau Claire County, 108 Wis. 304,
84 N.W. 430 (1900).
'3Nis" STAT. §62.15(lc) (1961).
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immediate action be taken, the requirement may be dispensed
with.
2 4
In many jurisdictions, the "emergency" rule has been held to
be an "implied exception" 25 to the "lowest bidder" statute. In Wis-
consin, however, the exception is statutory and arises when an
emergency is determined by the proper municipal body.20 The real
question is whether or not, in fact, there is or has been an emerg-
ency, because the officers of a municipality cannot defeat the pro-
visions of a statute requiring competitive bidding by declaring an
emergency where none exists2 7
While that which constitutes an emergency may vary from jur-
isdiction to jurisdiction, all pronouncements directly suggest some
degree of expediency and immediacy as the basis for the excep-
tion .2  However, in Wisconsin an emergency may simply be dis-
aster caused by man or nature,2 9 and the exception is made only for
"repair and reconstruction," while the "lowest bidder" statute itself com-
prehends "all public construction."3 0 The net result is that a later
judicial determination that an emergency did not exist will preclude
recovery, 31 at least on the contract.32
In Wisconsin, application of the bidding requirements has been
limited by statute to "public works." Yet, still on the books and
apparently good law are Ozaukee Sand & Gravel Co. v. City of
Milwaukee33 and Standard Oil Co. v. City of Clintonville,"4 wherein
the Wisconsin court held that the purchase of sand and gravel in
24 10 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.38, at 284.
25 Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 291 Pac. 839
(1930), and cases therein.
26WIs. STAT. §62.15(lb) (1961): "Exception as to public emergency. The
provisions of [subsection] (1) and [section] 144.04 are not mandatory for the
repair and construction of public facilities when damage or threatened damage
thereto creates an emergency, as determined by resolution of the board of
public works or board of public utility commissioners, in which the public
health or welfare of the city is endangered. Whenever the city council de-
termines by a majority vote at a regular or special meeting that an emergency
no longer exists, this subsection no longer applies."
27 10 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.38, at 286.
28 Cf. Annot., 71 A.L.R. 161 (1930). "The term 'emergency' as used in a pro-
vision dispensing, in case of an emergency, with a requirement of advertising
for bids before letting municipal contracts, implies a sudden or unexpected
necessity requiring speedy action." Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long
Beach, supra note 25. "Projects which display so imminent a need that nor-
mal procedures may be dispensed with must be of such sudden or unexpected
occurrence or exhibit a new condition calling for immediate action." Board
of Education v. Holk, 38 N.J. 213, 183 A. 2d 633 (1962).
29 46 Ops. Wis. ATr'y GEN. 298, 301 (1957).
30 WS. STAT. §§62.15(1), (1c) (1961).
3' 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.38, at 286.
32 Cf. Scatuochio v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 14 N.J. 72, 100 A. 2d
869 (1953), where a judgment on a void contract was modified so as to per-
mit an action to proceed on the basis of quantum meruit.
33 243 Wis. 38, 9 N.W. 2d 99 (1943).
34240 Wis. 411, 3 N.W. 2d 701 (1942), criticized in Ellerbe & Co. v. City of
Hudson, supra note 16.
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the first case and the purchase of road oil in the second case, both
of which were to be used by the municipality in road improvement
and repair, were mere "purchases of goods" and not the more com-
prehensive "public works" within the meaning of the provisions of
section 62.15 of the Wisconsin statutes. Hence, the city not only
did not have to advertise for bids, but could purchase these mate-
rials by private negotiation without regard to the amount of the
estimated purchase price involved. But as we have seen, the pur-
pose of such statutes has been said to be for the protection of the
public from the corruption or extravagance of municipal officers.
The narrow construction of the term "public works" overlooks the
fact that there may be corruption and extravagance with respect
to purchases by a city, as well as with respect to its "public works."
The Standard Oil Co. case serves further to illustrate the narrow
interpretation our court has given supposedly broad paternalistic
statutes. There, the city defended on the basis of a statute similar
in purpose to the "lowest bidder" statute and urged that the failure
of the comptroller to certify that funds were available, as required
by that statute, was a complete defense. The court disregarded the
protective purpose of the statute and held that since the city was
purchasing on an open account, there was no contract as contem-
plated by the statute, so that the comptroller's certification was
not necessary. 35
Still other situations have existed where our court has avoided
the strict confines of such statutes by a finding that advertising
would be futile or that it would be inherently impossible to pro-
mote a competitive price by bid. In one such instance, our court
said:
Some claim is made that there was no competitive bidding
for the contract. It appears that it was let to the Mineral
Point Public Service Company and that it was the only pub-
lic utility with which connection could be made, and that the
electors of the village by resolution directed connection with
this utility. Under such circumstances there was no room for
competitive bidding, as it is not required.
36
In such cases where protective requirements are dispensed with,
the only remaining requirements are that the municipal authorities
act in good faith and to the best interest of the municipality.37
35 "[Section] 62.09(10)(f) . . . provides that the city comptroller shall counter-
sign 'all contracts with the city if the necessary funds have been provided to
pay the liability that may be incurred thereunder, and no contract shall be
vaI'd until so countersigned! . . . We are confident that Standard Oil Co. v.
Clintonville . . . would have been decided differently than it was if [section]
62.09(10) (f) had been cited to the attention of the court instead of merely
[section] 62.15(12)." Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson, supra note 16, at
157-58, 83 N.W. 2d at 705-06.
36 Murphy v. Paull, 192 Wis. 93, 96, 212 N.W. 402, 403 (1927).
37 10 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.31, at 274.
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RATIFICATION AND ESTOPPEL
Actually, ratification and estoppel are part of the contract remedy,
for when properly invoked they will result in the recovery of contract
damages, with the net effect that the contract is actually enforced.
Though they are two completely different concepts,38 some courts have
confused the two theories to the point that the true basis of a decision
cannot be ascertained.39
(a) Estoppel
It has been said that "the doctrine of estoppel is predicated upon
common honesty, and municipalities as well as individuals are affected
by it" ;40 so that while there may be slight conflict on some cases as to
which capacity of the municipality the doctrine may be applied against,
4 1
it is generally agreed that a municipal corporation may be precluded
by an estoppel in pais the same as a natural person.42 In order that an
estoppel in pais may arise, there must be (1) inequitable conduct
on the part of the city, and (2) irrepairable injury to parties honestly
and in good faith acting in reliance on the city's conduct.1
38"Estoppel. A man's own act or acceptance stops or closes his mouth to allege
or plead the truth .... The substance of 'estoppel' is the inducement of an-
other to act to his prejudice. The substance of 'ratification' is confirmation
after conduct." BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 648, 650 (4th ed. 1957). "Ratification.
In a broad sense, the confirmation of a previous act done either by the party
himself or by another; confirmation of a voidable act." Id. at 1428.
29 "Ratification of an invalid municipal contract, estoppel to deny the validity
of a municipal contract, and municipal liability on an implied contract, where
there is no express contract, or the express contract is invalid, are often so
confused and jumbled together in decisions that the precise ground on which
a recovery is allowed or disallowed is uncertain and oftentimes incapable of
ascertainment. For instance, where a contract is invalid, but the municipality
has accepted benefits thereunder, some decisions treat such acceptance as a
ratification, others speak of it as an estoppel to deny the validity of the
contract, while still others admit there can be no recovery on the express
contract but hold that the acceptance of the benefits raises an implied con-
tract, without referring to any ratification or estoppel. . . .The rules as to
ratification of corporate contracts and estoppel to deny the validity of such
contracts being so interwoven, and the exact division line between ratification
and estoppel in many cases being so shadowy, it is deemed preferrable to
treat these two together." 10 McQuILuN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.103, at 415.
40 Id. at 416.
41 In Eau Claire Dells Improvement Co. v. Eau Claire, 172 Wis. 240, 179 N.W.
2 (1920), where the city leased its water works system to a private firm, the
court discussed the application of estoppel against the city as follows: "Bear-
ing this in mind, and bearing in mind that the contractual rights spring from
a proprietory and not from a governmental exercise of municipal power,
it follows that estoppel can be urged against the city upon the same grounds
and sustained by the same proof that is essential against a private person."
(Emphasis added). Id. at 258, 179 N.W. at 9. Then, in L. G. Arnold, Inc. v.
Hudson, 215 Wis. 5, 254 N.W. 108 (1934), the Eau Claire case is cited as
authority for the following: "[I]n certain situations cities, like private indi-
viduals, may be estopped, whether acting in a governmental or proprietary
capacity .. " Id. at 10, 254 N.W. at 110. (Emphasis added.)
42 Stuart v. City of Neenah, 215 Wis. 546, 255 N.W. 142 (1934). Cf. City of
Madison v. Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation, 20 Wis. 2d 361, 372, 122 N.W.
2d 409, 416 (1962).: "The city considered the contract in existence from July
5, 1956, through May 10, 1962, at which time, by resolution it terminated the
contract. It would be a serious miscarriage of justice to allow the city at this
time to assert the non-validity of the contract."
43 Stuart v. City of Neenah, supra note 42, at 549, 255 N.W. at 144 (1934).
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However, the application of the doctrine is not absolute. Since the
doctrine of estoppel is equitable in nature, care must be taken that other
rules are not violated. The first important rule relates to ultra vires
contracts, which are, as has been stated, contracts beyond the grant of
power to the municipality or expressly prohibited by constitution, stat-
ute, or charter. 44 At least one authority states that a city may not be
estopped to deny the validity of a contract that is ultra vires in the
sense that it is not within the power of the municipality to make, be-
cause estoppel or any other equitable principal may not be invoked
against a governmental body where it would operate to defeat the ef-
fective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. 45 In Wis-
consin, an ultra vires contract, ultra vires because the municipality
lacked power due to a constitutional prohibition, has been described as
"illegal and void."' ' 6 Use of such language indicates that a Wisconsin
court would not invoke estoppel to defeat the effective operation of a
constitutional provision.
Even where the contract is intra vires, or within the scope of the
power of the municipality and not expressly prohibited, but defectively
executed because of non-compliance with the particular statutory re-
quirement of certain formalities in letting the contracts, 47 estoppel will
not be invoked against the municipal corporation.
Although it has been held that in certain situations cities, like
private individuals, may be estopped, whether acting in a gov-
ernmental or proprietary capacity, we have found no decision
of this court in which it has been held that a city may incur mu-
nicipal liability by estoppel where the applicable mandatory stat-
utes have not been complied with. To so hold would operate to
nullify the several statutes which have been enacted by the leg-
islature for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of munici-
palities. The whole tenor of our decisions has been to require
municipal corporations implicitly to obey the law in regard to the
letting of contracts or the incurring of municipal liability, and
to deny to claimants against municipalities recoveries unless the
law relating to the making of municipal contracts has been fully
complied with.4
In the case of Federal Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa,49 it was
further stated:
This principle [i.e., that the laws with respect to the letting of
contracts must be complied with] also makes impossible applica-
tion of the doctrine of estoppel as a means of binding a mu-
nicipality. Where creation of a contract in any but a specified way
44 Cf. note 4 supra.
45 10 McQUlLLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.104, at 424.
46 City of Kiel v. Frank Shoe Mfg. Co., supra note 6, at 597, 4 N.W. 2d at
119 (1942).
47 Cf. statutes cited notes 11-14 supra.
48L. G. Arnold, Inc. v. Hudson, upra note 41, at 10, 254 N.W. at 111 (1934).
49231 Wis. 655, 286 N.W. 546 (1939).
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is prohibited, the city may not by waiver, ratification, or acts or-
dinarily amounting to an estoppel give vitality to the prohibited
contract or become bound upon principles of restitution.5°
So it appears that the rule in Wisconsin is that failure to comply
with a particular statutory formality will preclude recovery even in-
directly by an estoppel to deny the validity of the contract. While it
appears that it is again important to distinguish between "mandatory"
and merely "directory" statutes, it is equally important to recognize that
estoppel is an equitable doctrine and all factors should be considered
when estoppel is invoked.5' So while "care must be taken that other
principles of law are not violated,"52 and while recovery will not be
allowed unless the laws relating to municipal contracts have been fully
complied with, it is unlikely that anyone would be seeking the aid of
equity in the first place if the law had been complied with.
If this be the rule in Wisconsin,53 then certain contracts from their
very nature could never be the basis for applying the doctrine of es-
toppel; e.g., where there has been a violation of the "lowest responsible
bidder" statute because it is no longer possible to comply with the re-
quirements of the statute.
It is also interesting to note that while the cases hold that estoppel
will not lie, section 62.295 of the Wisconsin statutes, permitting rea-
sonable payment for work done in good faith, has much the same im-
pact as invoking estoppel and is probably directed in part at the harsh-
ness of the common law rule in Wisconsin.
(b) Ratification
At the outset, the doctrine of ratification must be distinguished from
quasi-contractual recovery, since there is a different legal basis for both
and a difference in the measure of recovery; e.g., the contract price in
the former and the amount of unjust enrichment in the latter case.
Still, many courts use the terms mistakenly, speaking of ratification and
then only allowing recovery in quasi-contract. This may be due in part
501 d. at 660-61, 286 N.W. at 548.
51 "The author is inclined to eschew generalizations that recovery is or is not
possible in favor of a fuller consideration of the justice and significance of
permitting this relief depending upon the particular mandate disregarded and
social factors underlying the individual requirement." 1 ANT-MAU, op. cit.
supra note 10, §10.02, at 650.
52 10 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 1, §29.104, at 426.
53 Compare with Eau Claire Dells Improvement Co. v. Eau Claire, supra note
41, at 257, 179 N.W. at 9: "Plaintiffs are not seeking to have their acts legal-
ized by or through the conduct of the city, for this they cannot do. But they
are saying to the city that, be our acts lawful or unlawful, you have no right
to complain thereof, because you have not only silently acquiesced therein with
knowledge of all the facts, but you have actively encouraged and permitted
us to make these valuable improvements, and you are therefore estopped to
forfeit the contract through conduct permitted and encouraged by you, and
resulting indirectly to your benefit through building up your city as a manu-
facturing center and adding hundreds of thousands of dollars to your tax
roll."
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to the fact that the amount of recovery may happen to be the same in
both instances. 54
Much the same thinking prevails in Wisconsin with respect to rati-
fication as it does with respect to estoppel. For example, as in the case
of estoppel, the doctrine of ratification will not be allowed to validate
the contract if the contract is ultra vires in the strict sense. 55 Where,
however, it can be demonstrated that the municipality has the power
to authorize acts or contracts in the first instance, it can ratify them
after they have been entered into defectively. 56 Also, acts and contracts
of its unauthorized agents may be ratified by a municipal corporation
with the equivalent effect of "previous authority," but only if the
agents acted within the scope of corporate power.57
Where a particular statute operates as a prohibition against the cre-
ation of a liability in any other than the specified way such as by pas-
sage of an ordinance, even if the statutory directions are construed to
be "mandatory" and have not been followed, recovery may be had
on the contract"8 if the municipality subsequently so conducts itself that
it can be deemed to have ratified the contract. Of course, this only holds
true if the contract is susceptible to ratification.59 As we have seen,
this is not the case with estoppel.
How, then, does the municipality "subsequently so conduct itself
that it can be deemed to have ratified the contract"? The answer is
found in Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson,60 where Justice Currie states:
[W]hen ratification is relied upon in order to enforce a con-
tract against a municipality, which contract was entered into
without authority of the proper municipal officer, board, or gov-
54 Compare City of Texarkana v. Keeney, 50 S.W. 2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932), and Shulse v. City of Mayville, 223 Wis. 624, 271 N.W. 643 (1937),
wherein our supreme court stated: "If the contract made by the mayor with
the plaintiff had been in fact ratified, the defendant would be liable at the
contract rate if the rate had been fixed. Upon principles of unjust enrichment
the defendant is liable only for the amount of the benefits received." Id. at
633, 271 N.W. at 647.
55 "It is one thing to apply the doctrine of irregular use of a power that exists,
and quite another thing to create a forbidden power by a forbidden act. The
former is nothing more than a waiver of the regularity of the exercise of a
power which the municipality may exercise-a valid ratification of an ir-
regular act because there was the power to exercise it regularly. The latter
would be the creation by an unlawful act of a power expressly withheld."
Menasha Wooden Ware Co. v. Winter, 159 Wis. 437, 440, 150 N.W. 526, 528
(1915).56 Murphy v. Paull, supra note 36, at 96, 212 N.W. at 404 (1927).
5" Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson, supra note 16, at 155, 83 N.W. 2d at 704.58 See note 54 supra.
59 As suggested previously, there are some contract situations, such as where
there has been a violation of a "lowest bidder" statute, which are inherently
incapable of ratification by subsequent corporate action because it is no longer
possible to comply with the requirements of the statute. To allow a so-called
"ratification" would be circumventing both the statute's formalities and the
very purpose for which the statute was passed.60 1 Wis. 2d 148, 83 N.W. 2d 700 (1956), rehearing denied, 85 N.W. 2d 663 (1957).
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erning body, the acts relied upon for ratification must be suffi-
cient to have supported a contract originally."1
With regard to the mode of ratification, the rule is that a munici-
pality may ratify its defective contracts (a) by express act or (b) by
conduct. 62 Both methods imply some active conduct on the part of the
municipality. Mere passivity on the part of the municipality, at least in
Wisconsin, is not sufficient, for there cannot be ratification by ac-
quiescence.-
For example, to illustrate an express act of ratification: if there had
not been a valid ordinance passed authorizing the contract, where such
an ordinance was required, then it may be ratified only by a subsequent
ordinance. Or, under certain circumstances, ratification may be accom-
plished by a resolution of the common council pursuant to a curative
act. Such is the case in Wisconsin, though our statute64 only allows re-
covery for the reasonable value of the "benefits or improvements" and
not at the contract rate which is the usual measure in cases of ratifica-
tion.65 Similarly illustrative is the case of MacLeod v. Washburn,66
which was an action to recover for services of an attorney in litigation
connected with assessments for construction of a sewer. Since there
was no elected or appointed city attorney, the mayor engaged the plain-
tiff to defend ten suits against the city. The city council knew of and
acquiesced in the employment and the performance of the services, and
finally by resolution acknowledged the lawful employment of the at-
torney and discontinued his services. The court held the resolution to
be a ratification by the council of that which it had authority to do in
the first place. The court also upheld the plaintiff's action for the
reasonable value of his services, but apparently only because no contract
rate had been set when the plaintiff was engaged.
However, a more difficult problem is presented where, for example,
6 Id. at 156, 83 N.W. 2d at 705.
02 10 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §29.103, at 415 (3d ed. 1950).
63 "It must be held that where there is no formal ratification there is no ratifica-
tion at all. Ratification by acquiescence permits the city to become liable on a
contractual basis in a manner other than that specified by statute." Shulse v.
City of Mayville, supra note 54, at 634, 271 N.W. at 649.
64 WIs. STAT. §66.295 (1961) : "Authority to pay for public work done in goodfaith. (1) Whenever any city, village or county has received and enjoyed or
is enjoying any benefits or improvements furnished prior to December 1,
1960, under any contract which was no legal obligation on such city, village
or county and which contract was entered into in good faith and has been
fully performed and the work has been accepted by the proper officials, so
as to impose a moral obligation upon such city, village or county to pay
therefore, such city, village or county, by resolution of its governing body
and in consideration of the moral obligation, may pay to the person furnish-
ing such benefits or improvements the fair and reasonable value of such
benefits and improvements." This statute was held valid in Leuch v. Egelhoff,
260 Wis. 356, 51 N.W. 2d 7 (1952).
65 Shulse v. City of Mayville, supra note 54, at 633, 271 N.W. at 647.66 178 Wis. 379, 190 N.W. 124 (1922).
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there has been a failure to advertise for bids67 or make a prior ap-
propriation for the contract as required by statute,68 and the contract
is either (a) incapable of ratification 9 or (b) there has been no subse-
quent action on the part of the municipality sufficient to constitute a
ratification thereof.
If the requirement that rendered the attempted contract defective
is only "directory," then it is likely that the court will waive the defect
and no problem of ratification will arise. But if the requirement is so
essential to validity of the contract that it is construed to be mandatory,
then recovery will always be denied in a case such as one which involved
a violation of the "lowest bidder" statute because it is no longer pos-
sible to comply with the statute. Hence, such a contract is incapable of
ratification no matter what action the municipality takes. In the same
way, if a contract is rendered defective because of non-compliance with
a statute that affords the same type of protection as the "lowest bidder"
statute, and the contract is capable of ratification, recovery will be
denied when the attempted ratification is by an act of less dignity than
that which would have been sufficient to bind the municipality at the
outset. Otherwise, the very purpose for which such statutes were passed
would be circumvented.70
QUASI-CONTRACTUAL RECOVERY
Once again, the fundamental difference between ultra vires and
intra vires, but improperly entered into, contracts bears on the possi-
bilities of recovery. It can be said as a rule that on a contract that is
ultra vires because the municipality had no contractual power whatever
with regard to the subject matter of a purported contract, there can be
no recovery on principles of quasi-contract for the reasonable value
of goods or services, even when a benefit has been conferred. 7'
However, there is a wide split of authority as to whether quasi-
contractual recovery should be allowed when the contract is intra
vires, or within the general powers of the corporation to make, but
there has been a failure to observe the statutory requirements in the
formation of the contract.
Quasi-contractual recovery is usually denied where the clear word-
67 Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 328, 220 N.W. 207 (1928).
68 Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson, note 60 supra, at 157, 83 N.W. 2d at 705.
69 See note 59 supra.
70 "The attempt of the city council to ratify the acts of the city officers and to
direct them to continue the publication of the proceedings 'without the in-
tervention of a formal contract' was so clearly in contravention of the plain
mandate of the charter as to be nugatory and to confer no power upon the
city officials to make these payments. To hold that the city can, without com-
pliance with the provisions of its charter as to letting contracts to the lowest
bidders, ratify and validate illegal action on the part of city officials, would
confer upon the common council of the city the power to nullify the pro-
visions of its fundamental law at will." Wagner v. City of Milwaukee, note
67 supra, at 332, 220 N.W. at 209 (1928).
71 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §10.03, at 651 (1958).
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ing or the judicial interpretation of a local constitution, statute, or
charter prohibits the municipality from contracting in other than a
specified way. This is the general rule,72 with which Wisconsin is in
complete accord.73
The reasoning, as has been stated earlier, is that these statutes have
for their purpose the protection of public funds from extravagance,
favoritism, and corruption on the part of the municipality and its of-
ficials, 7 4 and any recovery whatsoever in the face of their violation
would render the statute's protection useless.
It may be of interest to note in examining such statutes whether
their requirements apply to methods of entering into a "contract" or
any method of incurring "liability." If the emphasis in the statute is
on "contract" and the alleged agreement is held void for failure to
comply with the statute, a strong argument could be made for recovery
in quasi-contract. Such recovery would not involve any method of con-
tracting as such, since the quasi-contractual remedy is to prevent un-
just enrichment and is imposed by law, not by the intent or conduct of
the parties.75 The end result is like or merely resembles contractual
relief. Other than this resemblance, a quasi-contract really has little to
do with contract theory today. One of the reasons for the misapplica-
tion is the failure to distinguish between an obligation implied in fact,
which is a contract, and an obligation implied in law, which is a quasi-
contract so called, but not really a contract at all.7 6 Hence, it cannot be
72RESTATEmENT, RESTITUTION §62, comment b (1937): "The rule may also apply
in the protection of the citizens of a community where a contract which is
contrary to the provisions of a statute has been made by its officers on its
account. Thus where a statute provides that a municipality can contract only
after specified precautions have been taken or only with the lowest bidder,
a person who renders services to a municipality under a contract violating
the terms of such a statute is not entitled to receive either the contract price
or the reasonable value of his services. .. ."Id., illustration 2: "In State X
a statute provides that no contract for work to be done for a municipality
where the contract price exceeds $10,000 shall be made unless it has been
passed upon at the regular session of the municipal council duly called. A
contracts with the city of Y for dredging for the price of $50,000, the contract
being approved only by the municipal officers. Upon completion of the work,
A is not entitled to reasonable compensation from Y although he believed that
the council had approved the contract or although he did not know of the
statute."
73Federal Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa, supra note 49; Probst v. City
of Menasha, 245 Wis. 90, 13 N.W. 2d 504 (1944), noted in 29 MARQ. L. REv.
70; and Ellerbe & Co. v. City of Hudson, note 60 supra.7 4See cases and statutes cited notes 11-16 supra.
75 In Board of Comm'rs v. Greensburg Times, 215 Ind. 471, 19 N.E. 2d 459, 462-63
(1939), the court stated: "The principle upon which this appellee is entitled to
recover is known in law as the doctrine of quasi or constructive, contracts.
Quasi contracts are a class of obligations which are imposed or created by
law without regard to the assent of the party bound. They rest solely on a
legal fiction and are not contracts at all in the true sense, for there is no
agreement. They arise from law or natural equity and are clothed with the
semblance of contracts merely for the purposes of the remedy."
76RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §5, comment a (1932) : "Implied contracts must be
distinguished from quasi-contracts, which also have often been called implied
contracts or contracts implied in law. Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts,
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said that there would be any recovery on the contract held void for
non-compliance with the statute in question. But if the interpretation
is that the municipality cannot incur "liability" except as authorized
by statute, that interpretation would seem broad enough to regulate
even liability in quasi-contract. The reasoning is that while the contract
and the quasi-contract are distinguishable by definition, they both re-
sult in a type of liability77 which should be within the contemplation of
the statute. This would seem to be more in keeping with the intent of
the restrictions and would also encourage greater care in protecting the
municipality. In Probst v. City of Menasha7 8 our court reiterated the
rule that "a city cannot become liable except in some manner author-
ized by law."'79
It might be worth noting, however, that the typical municipal situ-
ation is one where a contract was attempted, but the attempt failed.
Thus, the actual situation is perhaps closer to contract law than the
situations involving private quasi-contractual recoveries where there
was not even an attempt to enter into a consensual relationship.
In the same way, in the absence of prohibitions by constitution,
statute, or charter, quasi-contractual recovery is usually denied where
recovery would violate the spirit of a strong public policy80 such as the
common law and statutory prohibitions against "officer interest" con-
tracts.81
On the other hand, a number of courts have held that a municipal
corporation is bound to the same principles of honesty and fairness as
a private corporation or an individual and can thus be relied on to do
what it has promised, and that ordinary equity principles should be
applied in any event when a municipal corporation is sought to be
bound in quasi-contract.8 2
The general rule in those states where quasi-contractural recovery
is permitted is that it will be allowed only (a) when the municipal
corporation has received some tangible benefit, either in the form of
money, materials, or services, and (b) when to allow recovery would
not nullify the safeguards to the taxpayer provided by a statute such as
a "lowest bidder" statute or a "prior appropriation" provision. 3 The
reasoning for these two limitations is that the benefit will be used as
are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the per-
formance in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created
by law for reasons of justice. Such obligations were ordinarily enforced at
common law in the same form of action (assumpsit) that was appropriate to
true contracts, and some confusion with reference to the nature of quasi-
contracts have been caused thereby."
77 But differ as to the measure of recovery; cf. Shulse v. City of Mayville, supra
note 54.
78245 Wis. 90, 13 N.W. 2d 504 (1944).
79 Id. at 94, 13 N.W. 2d at 506.
8 0 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §62 (1937).
81 RHYNE, MUNICIPAL LAW §10-4, at 260 (1957).
92 Sluder v. City of San Antonio, 2 S.W. 2d 841 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928).
83 WOODWARD, QUASI-CONTRACrS §161, at 261 (1913).
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the measure of recovery if relief is given and that quasi-contract being
equitable, it will not apply, as we have seen with equitable remedies,
where another law would be violated. Hence, even if it can be shown
in a state where quasi-contractual recovery is allowed that no statutory
safeguard is being violated, recovery may still be denied because it
cannot be shown that the municipal corporation has received any bene-
fit.8 4 In addition, by statute Wisconsin permits cities to pay to persons
furnishing benefits or improvements the fair and reasonable value
thereof when they were provided under a contract which was not
legally binding. 5 The extent, however, to which the Wisconsin statute
goes in curing defects is unclear. Will it cure only defects which a
court may have waived in any event; or will it cure a violation of the
strong, protective "low bid" statute, which, as we have seen, are man-
datory and not susceptible to hindsight correction? The latter is sug-
gested in the case of Leuch v. Egelhoff,s 6 where the defendant had
rendered tree trimming service without complying with the "lowest bid-
der" statute, and the court affirmed an order overruling plaintiff's de-
murrer. The amended answers to which the plaintiff had demurred set
forth as a defense the provisions of section 66.295 of the Wisconsin
statutes as amended in 1949, and the passage and adoption by the com-
mon council of the city of Cedarburg of a resolution enacted January
10, 1950, in conformity with such statute, legally ratifying the payment
of the $5,320 to the defendant and reciting that the work and labor had
been performed by the defendant in good faith.
Still, a few jurisdictions always deny quasi-contractual recovery
where the attempted contract is invalid for non-compliance with any
statutory requirement, even where the requirement is only "directory.
s8 7
The practice of making the distinction between "mandatory" and "di-
rectory" statutes as the basis for allowance or denial of quasi-con-
tractual recovery has been criticized by at least one authority.88
84 First Nat'l Bank v. Joint School Dist., 187 Wis. 547, 203 N.W. 762 (1925).
It may well be that courts are unwilling to find that what the municipal cor-
poration received was a "benefit" for which recovery of its value can be had.
I ANTIEAU, Op. cit. supra note 71, §10.01, at 637, citing Luther v. Wheeler,
75 S.C. 83, 52 S.E. 874 (1905). However, RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §1,
comment b (1937), states: "The word 'benefit,' therefore, denotes any form
of advantage."
85 Wis. STAT. §66.295 (1961).
86 260 Wis. 356, 51 N.W. 2d 7 (1952).
87 Louisville Extension Water Dist. v. Sloss, 314 Ky. 500, 236 S.W. 2d 265 (1951).
88 "It is the conclusion of this author that there should be no general position
that, regardless of the violation of any particular constitutional, statutory or
charter provision, quasi-contract recovery should or should not be granted.
Nor is there any merit in the oft-repeated view of some courts and com-
mentators that quasi-contract recovery should be granted if only 'directory'
mandates are overlooked but denied when 'mandatory' requirements are dis-
regarded. Not only are there inadequate guides to such dichotomizing, but
there is great disagreement and uncertainty between the courts of the various
states as to the proper level for a particular requirement. Furthermore, there
is no justification and less reason for superficial generalizations from cases
in which a relatively insignificant requirement was overlooked, or for trans-
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The measure of recovery where quasi-contract relief is granted is
the amount of enrichment or the value of benefits received by the mu-
nicipality, and not the amount fixed by the promise.89 While this ap-
pears to be the general rule, 90 there is authority for allowing recovery
by the contractor of reasonable value less "unconscionable profits,"'"
and "reasonable expense of the performance of services actually ren-
dered, but not in excess of its actual expenses, and deleting profits. '92
An interesting thing often occurs when the situation is carried one
step further; that is, when the city pays a private contractor for work
performed under a void contract. If the contractor were suing, we
have seen that relief, sometimes even in quasi-contract, would most
likely be denied. Where, however, the municipality is suing the private
contractor for money paid on an allegedly void or defective contract,
recovery is generally denied the municipality. 93 The net result is that
the contractor gets paid the contract price; and the statute or public
policy which was designed to protect the taxpayer, and which was prob-
ably the sole factor in rendering the contract void or defective in the
first instance, is overridden by the municipal error in making the pay-
ment.
The rule in Wisconsin denying recovery has been stated as follows:
Where a municipality has received money, goods, or services,
and accepted the benefits, and it had power had it proceeded in
the statutory way to acquire the money, goods, and services and
it has paid therefor, an action will not lie to recover back the
money into the city treasury.9 4 (Emphasis added.)
Can this apparent conflict be reconciled? One view suggests that
quasi-contractual principles do not even apply once the city has paid:
Summarizing briefly, it would appear that the reason for the
anomalous rule denying quasi-contract recovery from munici-
palities for goods and services rendered under contracts declared
illegal, and at the same time denying recovery to the municipality
for payments made therefor, is that in the first case a strong
public policy operates to prevent recovery in a case otherwise
posing decisions involving one statutory or charter requirement into situa-
tions involving others. There must be an insistence upon a conscious weighing
of social utilities by the judiciary when a particular mandate has been over-
looked, a consideration of the reasons behind particular rules and whether
they can be respected and even attained by quasi-contract relief, a reflection
upon the degree of culpability of the private contractor and an appraisal
of whether quasi-contractual relief will be an adequate deterrent to the
practice in its denial of profits. It should be obvious that the answers when
one requirement is overlooked are ordinarily quite inapplicable and irrelevant
in a consideration of others." 1 ANTEAU, op. cit. supra note 71, §10.01, at 646.
89 Shulse v. City of Mayville, supra note 54, at 633, 271 N.W. at 647 (1937).
90 1 ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 71, §10.01, at 637.
91 Sluder v. City of San Antonio, supra note 82, at 842.
Hudson City Contracting Co. v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 17 N.J.
297, 304, 111 A. 2d 385, 391 (1955).93 Annot., 140 A.L.R. 550 (1942).
94-Federal Paving Corp. v. Wauwatosa, supra note 49, at 658, 286 N.W. at
548.
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clearly within the principles of such recovery, while the second
case is not within principles of quasi-contract recovery. There
the defendant has not been unjustly enriched, but has only ac-
quired by the action of the municipality in paying him what is
justly due, and the courts consider that to compel him to pay
it back would be making the court an 'engine of oppression
rather than an instrument of justice.' In other words, the courts
seem to have no inclination to make a public policy which de-
feats recovery in a case otherwise within quasi-contract recov-
ery principles. 5
Another view suggests that a distinction should be made as to
whether the contract is ultra vires, or intra vires but merely defectively
executed. In the latter case, one court held that recovery of sums paid
by the municipality should be denied, because the court thought the
municipality was in pari-delicto with the private party. 0
The argument could also be made that recovery is denied because
the municipality has placed itself in the position of a volunteer 7 by
payment on a contract in which, by definition, it has no interest"" what-
soever for the reason that it has no power to so contract or was pro-
hibited from contracting in other than a manner prescribed by statute.
One authority reconciles the divergence by an inquiry into whether
a benefit was conferred or not. If no benefit was received by the city,
it would seem proper for the city to successfully maintain an action to
recover back into the municipal treasury any money so paid out."
Then, the question might turn on what constitutes a benefit.100 If it
should so turn, the more equitable answer may be found because, in
most instances, an inquiry beyond a holding of ultra vires or intra vires
will show that a benefit has been conferred for which no compensation
has been paid.
In any event, whatever the reasoning, once a municipality has paid
the private contractor no relief is given, even by courts which would
deny help to the private contractor where he is trying to enforce the
attempted contract against the municipality. The results are even more
strange when squared against a statute or charter provision which has
for its purpose the protection of the municipality financially. It seems
that dismissal of the municipal suit to recover money mistakenly paid
out will hardly accomplish this purpose.
SuMMAY
A contract which is found to be ultra vires will preclude recovery
on the express contract, or by estoppel or ratification, and equitable
95 Comment, 30 MNARQ. L. REv. 278 (1946).
9G City of St. Paul v. Parking Meter Co., 229 Minn. 217, 39 N.W. 2d 174 (1949).9 7 
"A person who officiously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to
restitution therefor." RESTATEmENT, REsTITuTio §2 (1937).
98 Id., comment a.
99 10 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra note 62, §29.111, at 508.
100 See note 84 supra.
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principles will deny recovery in quasi-contract. The so-called intra
vires contract which has been defectively executed will result in an
analysis of that which rendered it defective. If the irregularity of the
method of entering into the contract is such as to deprive the mu-
nicipality of the protection of a safeguard against the extravagance or
corruption of its officers, then failure to comply with the statutory mode
of entering into the contract or disregard of a strong public policy will
render the contract void, and recovery either on the contract or a quasi-
contractual principle will be denied.
In some instances, the invocation of the estoppel principle will be al-
lowed if the law that has been disregarded is later complied with. So,
too, ratification will work to enforce the contract if the municipality's
governing body ratifies by an act of the same dignity and providing the
same protection as that necessary to enter the contract in the first
instance.
Of course, if the statute not complied with is held merely directory
and not mandatory, the courts will usually waive the defect.
However, where the municipality pays the private contractor, gen-
erally, with the possible exception of the ultra vires contract, an action
by the municipality will not lie against the private contractor to recover
the money so paid out, even where it operates to deprive the public of
a safeguard provided for by statute.
JOHN D. FINERTY
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